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SESSION ONE:
SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND PHMLOSOPHICAL ISSUES
JAMES MADIGAN: Our question today [October 22, 1999] is whether
America should recognize same-sex marriage. We have two sets of panelists
who will address this question. Joining us in this first session are Reverend
Gregory Dell and Rabbi Arnold Wolf, so we have a nice representation from
the clergy; I think it is important to have a religious perspective on this issue
rather than one dominated by law. Dwight Duncan joins us from Southern
New England School of Law. Dwight's got a connection to a case that actually
has a Chicago connection, which makes our symposium today quite timely.
Two Chicago alumni are on either side of the table in the Vermont same-sex
marriage case. Dwight Duncan has worked on amicus briefs on that particular
case. Vince Samar, is a professor of Philosophy at Loyola, and an adjunct
professor of Law at Chicago-Kent, works in Law and Philosophy, and is a good
friend. I thank him for coming on scant notice and vague emails; he was always
willing to accommodate us, and I appreciate that. Hannah Garber-Paul is from
the city of Chicago, a friend of Professor Nussbaum and Rabbi Wolf, a
member of "First Breath" which many of you may have heard of in Chicago, a
very well received theatrical production concerning the lives of gay and lesbian
youth. Our own professor, Martha Nussbaum, the Ernst Freund Professor of
Law and Ethics in the Law School, the Divinity School and the Department of
Philosophy here at the University of Chicago has graciously agreed to help us
by moderating. So we welcome them all, and we welcome you.
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MARTHA NUSSBAUM: Okay. This is what we'll do. Each speaker will speak
for no more than ten minutes. Then if speakers want to ask questions to one of
the other speakers, we'll have an opportunity for that to take place, but then we
will turn things over to questions from the floor. Reverend Dell will go first,
then Arnold Wolf, Hannah Garber-Paul, Vince Samar, Dwight Duncan, and I
will speak last. So, Reverend Dell.
REVEREND GREGORY DELL: Thank you. My hope is to speak considerably
shorter than ten minutes, but preachers always say things like that and never
make it. I guess that the briefest thing I could say is "yes" in answer to the
question: "Should America recognize same-sex marriage?" I am a United
Methodist pastor, currently suspended by my denomination following a church
trial, for conducting a service of holy union for two members of the
congregation I serve. In fact, it was the thirty-third such service I've conducted
over the last eighteen years. But until 1996, the United Methodist Church did
not have an explicit rule about conducting such services. We recognize, those
of us who conduct such services, and have done so in the United Methodist
Church from the outset, that technically, we were not performing weddings.
There is a very peculiar relationship in the United States between clergy
and the government. Peculiar in a lot of ways. But not the least of which is at
the point of wedding, at the point of creating a legal marriage, clergy become
agents of the state. Some clergy take that with great seriousness, to the point
that if in fact the state has any criteria for affirming this kind of relationship
between a couple, that the clergy feel themselves bound by that. I belong to
another group of clergy. Although I have acted as an agent of the state for
weddings for heterosexual couples for twenty-nine or thirty years, I have also
done what the state would call, if not illegal, then certainly not recognized,
services of wedding for couples who, for a variety of reasons chose not to get a
marriage license, but wanted an affirmation of their relationship.
Now, I say that by way of background because I want to say just very
briefly, about same-gendered relationships, that I cannot think of a single
reason why such services and such relationships should not receive the same
protections, the same possibilities, the same measure of accountability that
relationships between men and women experience in the institution of
wedding. Arguments notwithstanding about the purpose of the state's
involvement in wedding is because of its desire to protect children,
understanding that, it's certainly been my experience that gay and lesbian
couples are no less likely to have responsibility for the care of children than are
heterosexual couples, and, conversely, heterosexual couples are no more
expected, under at least some circumstances, to automatically begin producing
babies any more than gay and lesbian couples.
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For me, it is a matter of economic, political, civil and religious justice. My
tradition, my understanding of that tradition begins with an affirmation of the
goodness of creation. And the goodness of creation means that all identities are
in fact to be valued. That what we do with those identities needs care, support,
understanding, and at points, discipline, for the best expression of those. My
favorite example was, I'm a great chocolate lover. And I learned a long time ago
that five malted milk balls are joy and bliss. Six is sin. Just by virtue of what it
does to me, by having six. So in that same sense, I respond to understandings
about what might guide our human behavior in relationship and in the broader
society.
Well, I do want to limit my remarks to those, at this point. My hope is to
be able to engage in the discussion that will follow. I do need to be out of this
building by about 3:15. So if you see me leave, it's not because I'm mad,
although I may be. But that's not the reason I would leave.
NUSSBAUM: Thank you very much. Now Arnold Wolf.
RABBI ARNOLD WOLF: Well, if you hear two preachers speak less than
their allotted time, it will be a first in the history of the world. I want to use my
few minutes to explain, as I understand it, the situation of Jewish law on this
subject.
First, about homosexuality itself. The prohibition against homosexual-ity,
which is perfectly clear in the Bible and in rabbinic writings, applies to
homosexual behavior by a heterosexual male, which is presumed to have
idolatrous consequences and which is forbidden, and that is all that is
forbidden as such, in the classic documents.
Now, a little bit about what a rabbi is and is authorized to do. This will
demonstrate to you my ambivalence on this subject and on others. But, I think
it's an accurate description. Rabbis are not clergy. Judaism has no clergy.
Rabbis are experts in Jewish law and tradition who are privileged to teach it.
And sometimes to judge it. But never in the sense of a sacramental act of a
clergy person.
How do you get married, if you get married Jewishly? The bride and
groom marry each other. And the function of the rabbi, if any, is to make sure
that they have it right. The ceremony of Jewish marriage is about six or eight
ways of getting married, so that you have to be a great expert in order to go
through the ceremony and not be married. You would have to know how to
invalidate each element of that. For example, the document, or the exchange
usually given of something of value, or the statements, which are promises, and
so on.
Now what happens, if two people get married as Jews in a wedding that. is
not permissible in Jewish law? Or let's say, recognized in Jewish law. For
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example, if a mother presumed to marry a son, that marriage never happened.
No matter what they go through. It is null, it is void, it is simply not there.
More complicated is the case of an inter-marriage. Which, in principle, is also
impermissible, but after the fact has certain consequences. For example, if a
mother especially, but in later Judaism, the father or the mother happens to be
Jewish, the child will be Jewish.
Now the case of same-sex marriage is something like that. Which is to say,
probably, two people of the same-sex being married, according to Jewish law
are not married. That's where I come in, or out, as the case may be, because
there's nothing, in my opinion, that I can do about that. That I am free to do
about that. I get no pleasure out of that, I can hope for change, but it seems to
me, given the framework in which Jewish marriage resides, that is a long and
hard and possibly improper way to go.
It may be that such people should be married outside of the situation
within Jewish law. In American law, I have no problem. Not only no problem,
I think same-sex couples should have every right that every other couple has, as
long as I am not constrained to act against my authorization or against my
conscience and participate in it. That's ambivalent, and a little bit mealy-
mouthed, for which I apologize, but it's accurate as to where I stand. In other
words, you guys do it. Just leave me out.
NUSSBAUM: Thank you. Now, Hannah Garber-Paul.
HANNAH GARBER-PAUL: Before I get started, I would like to thank
Professor Nussbaum and Jim Madigan for inviting me to speak. It's a really
great honor, and I appreciate it a lot. I'm a little bit nervous, if you can't tell.
Sorry.
When we consider the justifications of same-sex marriages, or marriage in
general, we really have to think about what it means within our society to be
married. What role marriage plays in our society, and what it truly means to be
married. In my opinion, marriage is an affirmation of a relationship that is
already there. It doesn't make the love happen; it doesn't create loving families;
it doesn't create suitable parents. It simply affirms what was already there. And,
by letting two people marry, we say as a community and as a society that we
have faith in the couple. It says that we believe that they are capable, and that
we believe in the relationship that they have, and that we believe that they can
form a loving and nurturing environment for themselves and for their children.
Within our society recently, we have begun to view people who are gay as
being capable of having these loving and nurturing relationships. We're
moving off of the traditional view that people who are gay are inherently wrong
or evil or deviant. We've also begun to question what a true family is. We're
moving away from the traditional view that a family is always going to be a
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mother and a father and children. We now accept the fact that there are going
to be inter-marriage relationships. We accept inter-racial relationships. We're
creating more equal families, where the wife is no longer the property of the
husband. We believe that it's alright for families not to have children
necessarily, or not to produce their own children and be seen as still true
marriages.
Because of that, because we are now moving away from a marriage that's
based on procreation, it seems logical to me, that since gay people are capable
of having the same form of relationship as a heterosexual couple, that we
should also allow them to have the same affirmation and support from our
community. Conversely, in our refusal to permit gay people equality within
this institution, we are in fact saying that we believe that they are second-class
citizens. We are saying that because of how they love, we are going to treat
them unequally, and that we are not going to accept them as full members into
our community.
As a young woman within our society, I am urged constantly to have
within my life the goal of getting married-to form a committed and loving
relationship. Our society maintains that the need to seek out and create this
loving family of my own is one of the highest goals I can achieve along the way
to becoming a true equal member, an adult member of our community.
However, I am told that if I find that relationship with a member of my
own gender, regardless of how loving and how committed we are, that within
our society we will not be valued equally. We will not be allowed to share a
mortgage, or job benefits. If we separate, strangers can take our children. If one
of us is in the hospital, the other one may not be able to see them. How can we
maintain a loving and supportive and stable family if our society is going to
attack the essence of our humanity? They are denying us the ability to maintain
a family. They are denying us support. They are denying that we are true equal
members of humanity. And it's not because of any rational judgment on our
individual ability to love, or to nurture. It's simply because people that we
choose, that we love and that we want to spend the rest of our life with happen
to have the same gender as we do.
NUSSBAUM: Thank you very much, Hannah. Now, Vince Samar.
VINCENT SAMAR. Let me first express my very heartfelt appreciation to the
University of Chicago Law School Roundtable for inviting me to participate on
so distinguished a panel discussing the very important civil rights topic of
same-sex marriage. The members of the Roundtable have shown great
discernment in recognizing that the question of what to do about same-sex
marriage is certainly one of the cutting-edge civil rights issues of the new
2000]
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millennium. To me, the issue is both very clear and very difficult.' Very
difficult because, at present, there is no clear societal consensus on the political
morality of same-sex marriage. Very clear because the best theory of politics-
the one that protects basic human dignity-requires that same-sex marriage be
made available to all persons on the same basis as opposite-sex marriage. Permit
me to explain why this is the case, and let me begin by saying why marriage in
general is (and ought to be) a fundamental human right.
I begin by noting that the institution of marriage is formed as a reflection
of the partners' mutual love. Alan Gewirth has said that it is entered into for
purposes that enhance the partners' general abilities of agency (that is, their
individual freedom and well-being) as evidenced by its ability to enhance their
"deeply intimate union and extensive mutual concern and support for each
other."2 Martha Nussbaum has added that "emotionally and morally, being
able to enter a legally recognized form of marriage means [having the]
opportunity to declare publicly an intent to live in commitment and
partnership," to seek public recognition as a union, and to engage in the
expressive act of "declaring a commitment in the presence of others."'
As such, marriage contributes to individual human capacity-fulfillment by
making each partner the best that he or she can be with respect to human
relationships. It also contributes to individual self-worth and dignity by
allowing the partners to be both the locus and source of the purposes that each
wants to fulfill. The attribution of dignity is as true for gay and lesbian couples
as for straight couples. For it is supervenient on the natural fact that each
partner is a voluntary, purposive agent who can reflect and evaluate the various
ends that constitute a fulfilled life for himself and his partner. And it is also
supervenient on a system of ethics or morality (I do not distinguish these here)
that would advance self-fulfillment.
Now any system of morality has to presume that the persons it addresses
are capable of following its prescriptions. That is to say, it has to presume the
actors to be both voluntary and purposive, to be agents. This is a simple result
of Kant's dictum "ought implies can." What is interesting is that out of these
two elements of voluntariness and purposiveness, Gewirth is able to derive
(from within the internal conative standpoint of the agent) rights to freedom
and well-being respectively.' These rights, in turn, especially the right to
freedom, justifies the subprinciple that every person has the right to enter into
1. For a discussion of the relationship between easy, hard and very hard cases, see Vincent J. Samar,
Justijying Judgment: Practicing Law and Philosophy (Kansas 1998).
2. Alan Gewirth, Self-Fulfillment 143 (Princeton 1998).
3. Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice 201 (Oxford 1999).
4. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago 1998).
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such voluntary associations as would enhance his or her individual human
capacity-fulfillment. And, under this subprinciple, one finds a justification for
the particularist purpose of forming families with special purposes, including
the purpose of affording preferential concern for one's spouse. Thus, the
universalist moral principle of human rights justifies the creation of marriage
contracts under the subprinciple that permits voluntary associations to be
established.
The formulation of marriage contracts is an idealization of this particularist
preferential concern. It becomes problematic only when it is laid down with
baggage related to a history of sexism inherent in our culture. But this does not
mean marriage itself need be so laden. For presumably one can enter into a
relationship of mutual love that recognizes each partner as equally capable of
giving and receiving nurturing and support as well as control and direction
over the benefits of their spouse. Indeed, gay men and lesbians having been
raised as males and females respectively may be in the best position to work out
the requirements of this mutuality since they would likely be carrying less role-
playing baggage than their heterosexual counterparts.
When two men or two women enter into a relationship reflecting their
mutual love, that relationship has the greatest chance of enhancing each of
their individual capacities to become the best that he or she can be with respect
to human relationships. It also serves as a positive role model for the society
where relationships are not always so mutual. This is particularly true when the
parties to the relationship have had to fight for this right, as gay men and
lesbians are now doing all over the country.
But it is also true that a double standard results when marriage is legally
allowed only to opposite-sex partners but not to same-sex partners. As
Nussbaum notes, the denial of the opportunity to marry, "reinforces
stereotypes that lesbians and gay men are rootless, antisocial and incapable of
sustaining permanent relationships thus contributing further to their
marginalization and isolation." When marriage is denied to gays and lesbians
but not others, the result is a justifiably deep resentment against this double
standard by all who might benefit from it. The basis of this resentment resides
in the normative reality that the partners' equal rights to freedom and well-
being are being violated.
Now, it is true that universalist morality also sets the conditions for
denying the creation of certain voluntary associations. But the only time a
person can be denied the right to enter into a voluntary association (in our case
of marriage) is if their entering into such a contract would violate the equal
5. Nussbaum, Sex and SocialJustice at 202 (cited in note 3).
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rights to freedom and well-being of others. This simply is not the case with
same-sex marriage. No comparable rights of others are violated by the
institution being made available to same-sex couples. To the contrary, as
Eskridge has pointed out, it seems quite telling of whose rights are being
denied that "heterosexual pedophiles, transvestites, transsexuals, sadists,
masochists, sodomites, and hermaphrodites" can get marriage licenses in every
state but gay people cannot! If this were all I had to say, it would, at least, lead
to the conclusion that it is morally permissible for the state to recognize same-
sex marriage for gays and lesbians. But I am after larger game. I want to make
the argument that the state should be morally required to make same-sex
marriage available to all on the same basis that it makes opposite-sex marriage
available.
The basis for this stronger claim is that same-sex marriage is a positive
good to the individuals who participate in it and to the society that makes it
available. I have already said how it is a positive good to the individuals who
participate in it by enhancing their individual human capacity-fulfillment. So
now let me focus on how it is a positive good to the society. Here the
important point is that same-sex marriage extends human autonomy by way of
giving individuals further control over their own lives. Since one justification
for democratic government, under universal morality, is its ability to promote
individual autonomy, autonomy must be one of the ends of such governments.
This follows from the fact that democratic government, like all government,
places restrictions on individual autonomy. For these restrictions to be justified
as a matter of universal morality, it must be the case that government restricts
freedom only when necessary to insure the equal rights of all. Anything more
would be an unjustifiable usurpation of individual freedom.
In the case of marriage, human autonomy is manifested by the ease of
legal, social and economic arrangements that attend marriage and which grant
to the parties greater freedom to interact both with each other and with the
society at large. We must not lose sight of the fact that marriage, in the sense
that I am considering it, is a social/legal institution that has a long history of
goods associated with it. These goods, which in Baehr v Lewin,7 the Hawaii
Supreme Court identified, include:
(1) a variety of income tax advantages, including deductions, credits, rates,
exemptions, and estimates; (2) public assistance from and exemptions relating to the
Department of Human Services; (3) control, division, acquisition, and disposition of
6. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to Civilized
Commitment 12 (Free Press 1996).
7. 852 P2d 44 (Hawaii 1993).
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community property; (4) rights relating to dower, curtesy, and inheritance; (5) rights
to notice, protection, benefits, and inheritance; (6) award of child custody and
support payments in divorce proceedings; (7) the right of spousal support; (8) the
right to enter into premarital agreements; (9) the right to change of name; (10) the
right to file a non-support action; (11) post-divorce rights relating to support and
property division; (12) the benefit of the spousal privilege and confidential marital
communications right; (13) the benefit of the exemption of real property from
attachment or execution; and (14) the right to bring a wrongful death action.
To not allow these goods to be available to same-sex partners on the same basis
that they are made available to opposite-sex partners, would substantially limit
the partners' individual autonomy. Even to make these goods available only by
an expensive and complicated process of separate legal transactions, including
the making of wills, contracts, powers of attorney, etc., with many different
parties, would damage individual human autonomy. It would discriminate
against poorer gays and lesbians, and it would send the message that all gay and
lesbian relationships were of less worth since they do not qualify for the far
easier way in which these goods are normally distributed. This sub-classing of
one group to another in no way fulfills the state's moral obligation to provide
maximal autonomy for all of its members equally. To the contrary, it undercuts
that goal as to require that same-sex marriage be allowed as a reasonable and
legitimate method for fostering the autonomy of the state's gay and lesbian
members.
In this short talk, I have tried to make the argument that same-sex
marriage is not merely permissible in a society that recognizes opposite-sex
marriage, but that its availability is morally obligatory. This is a result of the
fact that same-sex marriage contributes to human capacity-fulfillment in the
sense of making the partners the best they can be with respect to human
relationships and contributes to maximal human autonomy. It also means that,
as a society, we should be less concerned about trying to decide whether to
permit same-sex marriage and more about how to make it available. I hope I
have made a slight contribution toward that goal.
NUSSBAUM: Thank you very much, Vince. Now Dwight Duncan.
DWIGHT DUNCAN: I guess I'm going to take a somewhat different tack
here. I plan to critique certain social science arguments made repeatedly by
those in favor of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, namely that, 1)
same-sex marriage was a historical commonplace in other times and cultures,
and 2) that children of homosexual parents develop just as well as children
raised by their mother and father. Both claims are in play in the Vermont
same-sex marriage case, Baker v Vermont, pending before that state supreme
court. I responded to both arguments in an amicus brief filed on behalf of New
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Journey, et al.8 In that case, plaintiff-appellants argued in their brief that
"recently published historical materials demonstrate that marriages, or
marriage-like relationships have been recognized and supported between people
of the same gender throughout human history."9 Two works, a law review
article and a book chapter, are cited in support of this claim,'" both by William
Eskridge, Jr., who is currently a law professor at Yale. Actually, the book
chapter is simply a re-working of the law review article, which in turn had its
origins in the same-sex marriage case brought in the District of Columbia,
wherein Professor Eskridge was counsel."
These cannot be refuted here in detail, but a law review article (this is my
show and tell portion), a law review article I co-authored does so in a detailed
manner.'2 One example illustrates Eskridge's historical method: the case of the
Emperor Nero.' 3 Eskridge calls the same-sex marriages of the Roman Emperors
Nero and Elagabalus the best-documented historical instances of the
phenomenon: "The marriages of emperors such as Nero stand as examples of
publicly celebrated same-sex marriages in imperial Rome."' 4 Perhaps it is
instructive to quote in full the primary sources cited by Eskridge, and I'll quote
them in full to get the full context and flavor of how these imperial liaisons
were viewed in pagan antiquity, how far they were from being "recognized and
supported," as appellants' brief claims. Suetonius in his "Lives of the Twelve
Caesars" deals with Nero's same-sex marriages in a section dealing with his
"shameful and criminal deeds." "Little by little, however, as his vices grew
stronger, he dropped jesting and secrecy. And with no attempt to disguise,
openly broke out into worse crime. Besides abusing free-born boys and
seducing married women, he debauched the vestal virgin Rubria. The freed
woman Acte he all but made his lawful wife, after bribing some ex-consuls to
perjure themselves by swearing that she was of royal birth. He castrated the boy
Sporus and actually tried to make a woman of him. He married him with all
8. Brief of Amici Curiae New Journey, the Massachusetts Family Institute, Inc., the National
Association for the Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, Inc., Family Research Council, Parents and
Friends of Ex-Gays, Mark E. Williams, Rev. Dr. Andrew H. Selle, and Rev. Dr. Craig Bensen, Baker v
Vermont, 744 A2d 864 (Vt 1999) (No 98-032), filed byJ. Paul Giuliani and Dwight G. Duncan.
9. Brief for Appellants at 49 n 44, Baker v Vermont, 744 A2d 864 (Vt 1999) (No 98-032).
10. Eskridge, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage at ch 2 (cited in note 6); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A
History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 Va L Rev 1419 (1993).
11. See Brief for Appellants, Dean v District of Columbia, 653 A2d 307 (DC App 1995) (No 92 Civ
737).
12. Peter Lubin and Dwight Duncan, Follow the Footnote, Or, the Advocate as Historian of Same-Sex
Marriage, 47 Cath U L Rev 1271 (1998).
13. The discussion of Nero here follows closely the argument in Lubin and Duncan, 47 Cath U L Rev
at 1313-19 (cited in note 12).
14. Eskridge, The Case for Same-Sex Marriage at 23 (cited in note 6).
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the usual ceremonies, including a dowry and a bridal veil, took him to his
house attended by a great throng and treated him as his wife. And the witty jest
that someone made is still current: that it would have been well for the world if
Nero's father Domitius had had that kind of wife. This Sporus, decked out
with the finery of the empresses and riding in a litter, he took with him to the
assizes and marts of Greece, and later at Rome, through the Street of the
Images, fondly kissing him from time to time. That he even desired illicit
relations with his own mother, and was kept from it by her enemies, who
feared that such a relationship might give the reckless and insolent woman too
great influence, was notorious, especially after he added to his concubines a
courtesan who was said to look very like Agrippina. Even before that, so they
say, whenever he rode in the litter with his mother, he had incestuous relations
with her, which were betrayed by the stains on his clothing. He so prostituted
his own chastity that after defiling almost every part of his body, he at last
devised a kind of game, in which, covered with the skin of some wild animal,
he was let loose from a cage and attacked the private parts of men and women
who were bound to stakes, and when he had sated his mad lust, was dispatched
by his freed man Doryphorus. For he was even married to this man in the same
way that he himself had married Sporus, going so far as to imitate the cries of
lamentations of a maiden being deflowered."" Thus, Suetonius.
Needless to say, using such a monstrous figure as a poster boy for same-sex
marriage is ludicrous. As the leading commentator on Suetonius's "Life of
Nero" states: "Mention of specific elements of a normal marriage ceremony is
certainly intended by Suetonius to heighten the outrageousness of Neronian
libido in general, and the present episode in particular."" The commentary also
indicates that "It appears probable ... that Suetonius has confused Doryphorus
and Pythagoras," who was correctly identified in the account of Tacitus. And
Tacitus wrote, "Nero, who polluted himself by every lawful or lawless
indulgence, had not omitted a single abomination which could heighten his
depravity, till a few days afterwards he stooped to marry himself to one of that
filthy herd by name Pythagoras, with all the forms of regular wedlock. The
bridal veil was put over the emperor; people saw the witnesses of the ceremony,
the wedding dower, the couch and the nuptial torches; everything, in a word,
was plainly visible, which, even when a woman weds, darkness hides."' So
Tacitus was as disapproving as Suetonius. He continues: "A disaster followed,"
and goes on to describe the burning of Rome.
15. Suetonius, Lives ofthe Twelve Caesars 258-59 (Modern Library 1931) (Joseph Gavorse, trans).
16. KR. Bradley, Suetonius'Life of Nero: An Historical Commentary 161-62 (Latomus 1978).
17. The Complete Works of Tacitus 376 (Modern Library 1942) (Moses Hadas, ed) (Alfred John Church
and William Jackson Brodribb, trans).
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Do these historians think that Nero's same-sex weddings were
commonplace"? Indeed, all the classical pagan sources on the same-sex
weddings of both Nero and Elagabalus, far from expressing recognition and
support, express outrage and repugnance. Lampridius, for example, introduces
his "Life of Elagabalus" by saying, "I should never have put it in writing,
hoping that it might not be known that he was emperor of the Romans. Were
it not that before him this same imperial office had a Caligula, a Nero and a
Vitellius." And he then goes on to record that these emperors "were murdered,
dragged through the streets, officially called tyrants, and no man wishes to
mention even their names."'" No one, that is, except Eskridge.
Anyway, there's plenty more where that came from in my law review article
if you're perverse enough to want to continue.' 9
As to the second argument, the homosexual plaintiff-appellants in the
Vermont case, and their amici Vermont Psychiatric Association, et al. also
argue that "the children of gay or lesbian, or same-sex parents are as happy,
healthy and well adjusted as their counterparts with heterosexual or different
sex partners."" Appellants quote an American Psychiatric Association study,
which claims that "not a single study has found children of gay and lesbian
parents to be disadvantaged in any significant respect relative to children of
heterosexual parents. '2 ' Amici Vermont Coalition for Lesbian and Gay Rights
claim that "studies on this subject had unanimously concluded [that] children
being raised by gay and lesbian parents experienced developmental outcomes
substantially similar to those of children raised by heterosexual parents."2
These claims are false.
Even some of the studies cited by appellants and their amici, and provided
to the Vermont Supreme Court in a massive social science appendix to the
amicus brief of Vermont Psychiatric Association, belie the claim that there is
no significant difference between homosexual and heterosexual parenting. The
research has many limitations and flaws that do not permit the generalizations
that appellants would have the court draw. The studies were largely designed to
influence the courts, 3 with small sample sizes, inadequate control groups, non-
18. 2 The Scriptores HistoriaeAugustae 105 (W Heinemann 1924) (David Magie, trans).
19. See especially, Lubin and Duncan, 47 Cath U L Rev at 1312-21 (cited in note 12).
20. Amicus Brief of Vermont Psychiatric Association, et al at 24 & n 55, Baker v Vermont, 744 A2d 864
(Vt 1999) (No 98-032).
21. Brief for Appellants at 36 (cited in note 9).
22. Amicus Brief of Vermont Coalition, et al at 11 n 10, Baker v Vermont, 744 A2d 864 (Vt 1999) (No
98-032).
23. For example, Charlotte Patterson, co-author of a number of articles appended to Amicus Vermont
Psychiatric Association's brief, is quite open about her desire to influence courts: "[T]he research findings
can be brought to the attention of the courts in the form of amicus briefs.... Uncontroverted scientific
evidence may not influence the courts as much as some social scientists would like, because the social,
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random participation and consequent response bias. These significant
limitations cast significant doubt on the findings of such studies.
In 1993, Belcastro, et al. reviewed the published database studies on
homosexual parenting and evaluated each according to accepted scientific
standards. 4 Their "most impressive finding was that all of the studies lacked
external validity.' The conclusion that there are no significant differences in
children reared by lesbian mothers versus heterosexual mothers is not
supported by the published research database."' Indeed, other recognized
authorities conclude that "conducting research in the gay community is fraught
with methodological problems."' Now, suffice it to say that the
methodological problems of all these homosexual parenting studies are such
that the most that can be established from them is that the hypothesis of
equivalent results with mother/father parenting merits the Scottish verdict
"not-proven.
Obviously, this is a complex scientific issue. Belcastro, et al., Professor
Lynn Wardle of Brigham Young University,' Doctor George Rekers of the
University of South Carolina, and a forthcoming methodological critique of
homosexual parenting studies by Robert Lerner and Althea K. Nagai
demonstrate the weaknesses of all these studies. My own amicus brief in the
Vermont case thoroughly reviews the eighty studies submitted by the
appellants' amici and finds them essentially flawed" because of defects in
research design. Many studies do not include a heterosexual parenting control
group. Or they compare lesbian couples to single mothers. Thus, no
comparison is possible with mother/father parenting. Another defect is that
they use defective sampling techniques. These studies use small sample sizes
moral, and religious values of judges and legislators often hold sway over all other considerations ...
Because lawyers often have little or no training in the area, they often fail to appreciate the value of social
scientific evidence, believing instead in the superiority of moral and philosophical reasoning." Charlotte
Patterson and R. Redding, Lesbian and Gay Families with Children: Implications ofSocialScience Research for
Policy, 52 (3) J Social Issues 29, 45 (1996).
24. Philip A. Belcastro, et al, A Review of Data Based Studies Addressing the Effects of Homosexual
Parenting on Children' Sexual and Social Functioning, 20 (1/2) J Divorce & Remarriage 105 (1993).
25. External validation is defined as "validation of a measure by correlating it with an appropriate
external criterion as, for example, validating an aptitude test by establishing high positive correlation with
school grades." Dictionary of Behavioral Science 133 (Academic Press 1973) (Benjamin B. Wolman, ed).
26. Belcastro, A Review ofData Based Studies at 105-06 (cited in note 24).
27. L Koepke, J. Hare, and P.B. Moran, Relationship Quality in a Sample of Lesbian Couples with
Children and Child-Free Lesbian Couples, 41 Family Relations 224, 225 (1992).
28. Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U Ill L Rev 833
(1997).
29. This passage is drawn virtually verbatim from the amicus briefs section on parenting studies, which
was orginally drafted by Dr. George A. Rekers and Dr. Mark D. Kilgus of the University of South Carolina
School of Medicine.
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that are not random. Thus, no generalization is possible. And the studies
analyze data and interpret their findings erroneously.
Let me give you one egregious example, if I can find it. In their study of
children from homosexual and heterosexual mother-headed households, Green,
et al., stated in the abstract of their article, "no significant differences were
found between the two types of households for boys and few significant
differences for girls.""0 But this flatly contradicts the results reported in the
body of the article. In the amicus brief of Vermont Psychiatric Association to
the court, the inaccurate abstract is repeated: "no difference between 56
children of lesbian mothers and matched group of 48 children of heterosexual
mothers with respect to gender identity. No difference between sons in two
samples with respect to gender role behaviors. Daughters of lesbian mothers
demonstrated less adherence to traditionally sex-typed standards, though are
still similar to many other same-age girls."' With regard to statistically
significant differences between the two types of households for boys, however,
the body of the article states: "Thirty-two percent of lesbians' sons wanted to
play at both sexes' activities equally, as opposed to only ten percent of
heterosexuals' sons."" "Younger boys who had been living in a house without a
man for a longer period of time were more likely to mention a woman as a
person they would like to be like when grown."" "More children of lesbian
mothers showed a 'considerable' interest in play-acting and role-taking than
did children of heterosexual mothers."' "Sons of heterosexual mothers were
more likely to have experienced more than one period of separation from
father, whereas sons of lesbian mothers typically had experienced a single
separation."35 "For the two boys' groups, seventy-three percent of heterosexual
mothers encouraged truck play, compared to only thirty percent of lesbian
mothers."" "For the first year of life, the majority of lesbian mothers reported
having spent fewer daytime hours holding or touching their infant sons than
did heterosexual mothers."37 Furthermore, the article reported many statistically
significant differences between the daughters from the two types of households,
including: the daughters of homosexual mothers had significantly more cross-
dressing, more rough-and-tumble play, more playing with trucks, more play
30. Richard Green, et al, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children: A Comparison with Solo Parent
Heterosexual Mothers and Their Children, 15 Archives Sexual Behavior 167, 168 (1986).
31. Brief of Vermont Psychiatric Association, et al at 35 n 93 (cited in note 20).
32. Green, Lesbian Mothers and Their Children at 178 (cited in note 30).
33. Id at 178-79.
34. Id at 177.
35. Idat 174.
36. Id at 179.
37. Id at 174.
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with guns, more play with boys' activities, greater preference for both
masculine and feminine activity, and greater preference for taking masculine
adult roles than the daughters of heterosexual mothers. And "girls whose
mothers were active in lesbian or feminist organizations were significantly
likely to express an interest in traditionally masculine occupations. Fifty
percent of heterosexual mothers reported holding their daughters seven hours
or more per day in the first year, whereas only seventeen percent of lesbian
mothers reported holding their daughters this many hours."38 This impressive
list of developmentally important differences is hardly just a few differences, as
the authors' abstract misleadingly states.
To conclude, I would say that these studies do not provide a reliable basis
for a radical change in public policy such as the advocates of same-sex marriage
intend. There are other arguments for recognition of so-called same-sex
marriage that do not purport to be based on history and social science. I would
suggest that we proceed to those arguments without the encumbrance of an
advocate's tendentious reading of history or result-oriented sociological and
psychological studies. As one of my clients observed, "one of the beautiful
things about a democracy is that social scientists can ruin a generation, and
then come back twenty years later with our objective measures to validate what
common sense should have told us."39 Thank you.
NUSSBAUM: Thank you very much. Now, I'l be the last speaker.
Marriage has three aspects: the religious, the emotional, and the civic. The
three are in principle quite separate from one another, and here I'm only going
to address the third one. So I'm going to take the question posed in our title as
the question, "Should American law give legal and institutional recognition to
same-sex marriage?" Now, in a sense, the minute one poses the question in that
way, there seems to be but one reply that someone who supports the equality
and dignity of lesbian and gay citizens can give. If the only alternative to same-
sex marriage is the persistence of marriage as we know it, together with the
denial of marriage rights as they are now denied to same-sex couples, then
there's a powerful case to be made for opening those rights to same-sex
couples-and I think Hannah and Vince in different ways have made that
case-because marriage is a bundle of important civic privileges, not to have
which does define the status of same-sex couples as inferior. On the other
hand, what I will argue here is that the whole question should be taken up in a
more reflective way, not taking for granted the civic salience of marriage, as we
know it, with its large bundle of highly diverse privileges. I favor a thorough
38. Id.
39. Dr. Joseph Nicolosi, quoted in Don Feder, Gay Parenting at the Barricades, Boston Herald 21 (Sept
27, 1993).
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rethinking of the whole question of marriage as a civic status and experiments
with disaggregating its component parts. Many of these experiments are
currently being tried in European nations, and a similar more experimental
approach has long been advocated by many feminists who don't think that
marriage has such a sterling record that it should be immune from rethinking.
Other thoughtful writers on the topic have joined them in calling for a more
experimental approach, including such perhaps unlikely allies as Judge Richard
Posner and radical gay activist Michael Warner.
What is marriage as a civic institution? As Richard Posner notes in Sex and
Reason, "marriage is a status rich in entitlements."" And I was going to read out
the list from Baehr v Lewin4' that the Supreme Court of Hawaii put together,
but since Vince has read it already, I won't read that long list of fourteen civic
items. But I want to add this list is far from complete. To get even close, we
need to add the right of next of kin in hospital visitations, decisions about
medical treatment and burial, immigration advantages, and many other
discounts and privileges available to married couples on a more local basis.
Now this is a very large bundle of privileges. Obviously, it's better to have
them, than not to have them. And to be denied them on the basis of one's
sexual orientation seems to me to be a major form of social inequality and
hierarchy. But the question is why should there be this large bundling in the
first place? Many European nations recognize forms of contractual cohabitation
that confer many of the advantages of marriage, particularly with regard to tax
and inheritance. Even in the U.S., we recognize common law unions as
conferring many of the rights of marriage, particularly to post-divorce
maintenance or palimony. France has recently taken the most innovative step
yet, by making available civic solidarity pacts to people who have lived together
for a certain period of time and who contract to enter that status, which
confers privileges in areas including property, inheritance, and medical care.
The remarkable feature of the French arrangement is that it permits groups not
defined by a sexual or emotional bond to so register under certain conditions;
they may be relatives or even long-term intimate friends.
Feminist scholars have long expressed some skepticism about marriage,
because that institution has a rather bad history where women's equality is
concerned. Maybe it can change, maybe it is changing, and maybe the entry
into it of same-sex couples would be an agent in that change, but this is by no
means obvious. When women were chattels, there were very strong reasons for
bundling all those entitlements together under the umbrella of marriage. The
40. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (Harvard 1992).
41. Baehr, 852 P2d 44.
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institution, so conceived, served to cement men's control over women and
their own legitimate children. Equally obviously, it helped to define other
social groupings as inferior: single women, divorced women, groups of friends
living together, in fact every way in which women live without putting
themselves under male control. That definition of other female statuses as
inferior, was part of the point of bundling so many privileges together under
the rubric of marriage. Similarly, anyone who chose to have and raise children
not in the traditional, patriarchal family would lose out. And again, this was a
big part of the point of that institution. If we don't have the goal of cementing
male domination over women and children anymore, as both Posner and
Warner also observe, there's no very clear reason why all of these privileges
should in fact be bundled together. Some seem specific to households rather
than to romantic couples. Others may be more closely linked to close intimate
ties, but again it's not clear why these ties would have to be thought of as
marriages. Some nations already extend immigration advantages to unmarried
couples, Australia, for example. Even in the U.S., until 1996, it was possible to
win special immigration consideration for intimate partners. The abrupt
change that ensued caused many painful separations as people who loved one
another were deported. Child custody, similarly, could be linked to relations of
care for which evidence could be given rather than to marriage. India gives
federal government support to the formation of women's collectives, groups
that promote women's education, employment, and self-esteem. But also, they
promote a communal approach to child-rearing and the care of young children.
These women typically remain married in fact. But the privileges of being in a
woman's collective, or a songham, are often greater than those attached to
marriage.
Gay and lesbian couples, like many modern couples, are experimenting on
how to combine the features of coupling that used to be all grouped together
under the rubric of marriage. Consider this description from lesbian feminist
Claudia Card,
My partner of the past decade is not a domestic partner. She and I have formed
some kind of fairly common social unit, which so far as I know remains nameless.
Along with such namelessness, goes a certain invisibility. We do not share a domicile;
she has her house, I have mine. Nor do we form an economic unit; she pays her bills, I
pay mine. Although we have fun together, our relationship is not based simply on fun.
We share the sorts of mundane details of daily living that Richard Moore finds
constitutive of marriage, often in her house, often in mine. We know a whole lot
about each other's lives that the neighbors and our other friends will never know. In
times of trouble, we are each other's first line of defense. And in times of need, we are
each other's main support. Still, we are not married. Nor do we yearn to marry. Yet if
2000]
18 Roundtable
marrying became an option it would legitimate behavior otherwise illegitimate and
make available to us social securities that will no doubt become even more important
to us as we age. We, and many others like us, might be pushed into marriage.
Marrying under such conditions is not a totally free choice.
42
I think that is true of many heterosexual couples, too, that there is a subtle
coercion to enter that status even though it might not be the most sensible
choice for the individual people. And I might add, if Card and her partner
married, then everyone would expect them to live in the same house. If they
didn't, then people would think that was very weird or that they were not
getting along well and so on. So an arrangement that suits them well, and suits
many other people, would have to be given up perhaps in favor of some more
conventional norm.
John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty, described the many ways in which the
tyranny of public opinion prevents people from carrying out possible, fruitful
so-called experiments in living. Mill's call for a less dictatorial type of public
culture has recently been taken up, not only by feminists such as Claudia Card,
but also by Judge Posner, who explicitly took Mill as his starting point, in
calling for a more experimental approach to marriage and the statuses it
embodies. And it has been taken up by Michael Warner, who holds in his new
book, The Trouble with Normal, in a very Millian way that a "politics of
shame" often makes people follow the social majority, even when there are no
very good reasons to do so. The rush to endorse marriage on the part of many
gays and lesbians is, Warner argues, an unfortunate result of the social pressure
marriage brings to bear on us all, simply by being there as the defined,
privileged status.
Warner makes three arguments against taking marriage rights as a major
goal for the movement for lesbian and gay rights. His first argument is tactical;
working for marriage rights is a deflection of valuable resources and energy
away from causes that are both more urgent and more immediately possible, he
thinks-for example, aids prevention and education, and general
nondiscrimination laws in housing and employment. Indeed, there's no reason
to think that the marriage struggle is winnable in this country any time soon.
So it may well be that a lot of money and time is being simply wasted. Warner
also makes two deeper and more controversial arguments, closely connected.
The first is that by pushing for marriage rights unthinkingly, we validate the
social status quo, when we should really be thinking hard about what living
arrangements we want to support with what forms of state action. The second
42 Quoted in Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (Free Press
1999).
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argument is that the status of marriage as it exists in American society is
inherently discriminatory and hierarchical, setting up some couples as worthy,
and thus defining others ipso facto, as less worthy. The two arguments are
closely linked because Warner believes that a more reflective and experimental
approach to the bundle of political privileges currently associated with marriage
would be likely to lead to at least some disaggregation and that disaggregation
would produce a less hierarchical social state of affairs. I have suggested that
there are many reasons to accept both of those arguments, and to seek
therefore, a situation in which the various privileges and statuses now
associated with marriage will be disaggregated. This state of affairs would
indeed, as Warner argues, remove stigma from single people and in general
conduce to a society in which people would be simply less likely to stigmatize
one another around issues of sexual lifestyle. It will also encourage experiments
in living, at least some of which might prove fruitful. Given the sorry record
marriage has had as an allegedly protective home-but really a home that has
protected many things both good and bad, including battery and rape of
women, and including the sexual, physical and emotional abuse of children-I
think we need all the experimenting and creativity we can get if we are to have
a more flourishing society.
Let me stop and thank all of our panelists very, very warmly for what they
have said here. [applause]
And now what I think I'll do is moving from this end of the table to the
other end, I'll just ask each panelist if he or she would like to make one
comment addressing anything that any other panelist has said. And then I'll
throw things open to the floor.
DELL: Just maybe a brief response to Dwight's comments, which I found
illuminating and amusing. At this point, particularly, I also have a tendency to
be rather skeptical about sociological and historical arguments because one
always has to examine the one making the argument and the sources they
choose to use to support their position. I wonder sometimes for instance if an
argument around racism would best be supported by those who supported
slavery. But what was most amusing, I think, to me, and informative, was your
final comments about some of the actual differences between boys and girls. It
occurred to me that there may be a number of women among our number
today who are actually going after the male profession of being lawyers, as there
have been women now with the audacity to decide to become clergy persons.
So some of the distinctions, I wouldn't necessarily argue, I would simply,
rather, suggest that they can be evaluated in terms of their benefit to the
human family and to the expression of the full potential of an individual. But I
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would say just in general that I have appreciated very much the comments of
all of the panel members.
DUNCAN: Likewise, I found the discussion very interesting. I think the one
point I would like to pursue off the top of my head is the autonomy point that
Vince Samar made, and I'm just wondering if the autonomy argument that he
articulated would also basically encompass polygamy and incestuous marriage.
Would autonomy also lead to those results?
NUSSBAUM: I will let Vince answer when we get to him. I just want to
follow on what Greg Dell said. And to say that when you [Duncan] read the
list from the psychiatrist, I kept thinking, "Oh good. They don't play with
trucks all of the time." [laughter]
DUNCAN: Exactly.
NUSSBAUM: I think child psychologists always are subject to what Michael
Warner rightly diagnoses as the "tyranny of the normal." They somehow think
that a statistical norm is also a moral norm, or a norm of human flourishing,
and of course it isn't. Most children are unkind, greedy, and cruel. [laughter]
And if they see a child who is more reflective or more sensitive than another
child they typically try to say, "That child isn't in the group enough, etc." So
I'm skeptical of psychologists as are you [Duncan], but I am skeptical I think
for different reasons. Because I think they exhibit a lack of normative thinking,
but they behave as if they've already done the normative thinking.
SAMAR: I guess I have to respond, but before I do, I have a conscious
comment, too, and that is very simply, I like the last part of Mr. Duncan's
remarks because I thought they actually exposed why all the more same-sex
marriage is necessary. When you come in with less heterosexual role-playing
baggage, you don't necessarily confine children, who might have a lot of
experiences and a lot of directions to go, to one narrow role model that they
have to live up to. A boy doesn't have to necessarily go into the marines, or be
a truck driver-perhaps he will, perhaps he won't, perhaps a woman will-but
all these things are possible. And the idea that maybe we are upsetting role
models, yes, it's probably the case we are, and maybe that's a good thing,
because maybe in that autonomy comes.
As for the part about my discussion of autonomy, sure, let's consider
polygamy in the right context, not here, this is about same-sex marriage. Let's
consider incest in the right context, not here, this is about same-sex marriage.
Let's consider those on their merits as to whether they are good or bad. It may
turn out that polygamy, as it is usually thought of, as being available to men
and not women, is bad for reasons that have to do with domination of women.
And that may be a very strong argument for why that restricts autonomy. And
there might be problems with incest, or not. But those things can be handled
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on a one-by-one basis. We don't need to assume a slippery slope because we
allow same-sex marriage, that we necessarily allow all of the rest on the surface.
GARBER-PAUL: Everyone else has had wonderful comments. Very
interesting. I was going to comment on Duncan, as well. But everybody else
has, and they have all taken exactly what I was going to say. [laughter] Again, I
just wanted to add how interesting I found it. They helped to break down the
stereotypes of what it means to be a girl and what it means to be a boy and to
assume that based on your gender you have particular roles to fulfill. I kind of
like the idea that they don't have to do that anymore. Definitely a benefit in
my mind.
WOLF: I want to pick up on Martha Nussbaum's notion of disaggregation,
which I think is crucial, at least to a religious perspective. Religion it seems to
me should not endorse society as it stands, or images of society proposed by
various constituent groups thereof. For example, some people who are married
by American law are not married by Jewish law. The best case I know is the
following. An older man, very successful, marries a trophy wife. And shortly
after that drops dead. His son then marries the trophy wife, his stepmother.
This actually happened. It is permissible in American law; it is not permissible
in Jewish law. Something like that applies to abortion. Where it is perfectly
clear from Jewish law that a woman has a right to abortion at any time that she
claims to need it. But she should not avail herself of that right except when she
really needs it. And there are many other such cases, I think including the case
of same-sex marriages. I do not think that a religion must endorse or
participate in or perform that which the state probably ought to do-it
certainly ought to equalize the relationship of gay people with straight people.
Therefore, I have a little bit more than a personal stake, in saying it is the
state's business to settle this, and the citizenry in the first place. But as for me, I
am committed to a system of law and of theology, which forbids me to
participate in this process.
NUSSBAUM: Okay, now we will turri things over to questions from the
floor. You can address your questions to a specific panelist or throw it to all of
us, and we'll see who answers. Yes, Andy [Koppelman].
AUDIENCE: Mr. Duncan probably figures by now that people are going to
pile on him, so I apologize for the barrage. The question of how you measure
how a child is flourishing--the measures that you cite are controversial. There
are things that you might imagine when you started studying same-sex couples
you might have found that would certainly trouble some of us who are
advocates of same-sex marriage. There are dimensions of well-being that aren't
particularly controversial. Are kids doing well in school? Are they dropping out
of school? Are they showing psychiatric problems? Are they hurting themselves?
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Are they getting into trouble with the law? Is their ability to form relationships
impaired? Are higher numbers of girls getting pregnant before the age of
fourteen? There are some measurable aspects of well-being that you expect the
studies to turn up. And you are right that the studies are in the aggregate
flawed, and Belcastro's studies of children who are raised by same-sex couples
are flawed. Better studies need to be done. But even the flawed studies do show
us something. Isn't it indicative of something that none of these studies have
shown any worse outcomes on these unproblematic measures of well-being, so
that you have to stretch to controversial things like "Gee the girls are playing
with trucks," in order to find any difference at all?
DUNCAN: Well, I was addressing the comparative issue about heterosexual
parents versus homosexual parents, so I wasn't going at the issue on some kind
of an absolute scale of well-being. One of the many problems with these studies
methodologically, is that we don't have longitudinal studies. We don't have
studies over time. So for example, you said, numbers of girls under fourteen
that get pregnant. We don't have lifespan studies yet on this subject. But it
would really take that. One of my points is that basically we do not know what
the socio-effects of legalizing same-sex marriage will be in fact. And my view is
that since it is a radical change compared to not only what our own tradition
has been, but what pretty much the universal consensus of the world has been
on this subject, the burden of proof should be on those who are proponents of
the change. My point is just the sociological studies that they have produced
don't make the case.
NUSSBAUM: Could I just pose a question? Do you think the world as it has
been has been happy and good? [laughter] Because if you do, then there's
reason for wanting to keep it as it is. But Mill's whole point was that we might
not have that view.
DUNCAN: Well, obviously the world as it has been has been a mixture.
There are some good things and some bad things. There have been
improvements over time and there have been things that have deteriorated over
time in particular times and places. I don't want to come across as someone
who is opposed to any changes whatsoever in society. But here we are talking
about an institution that pretty much every society has the same view, that
homosexual relationships, whatever their status, are not entitled to be
recognized as marriages, among other reasons because of the relationship
between marriage and future generations. And however else you consider it,
homosexual couples are incapable of procreating as a couple.
SAMAR: I find it interesting that the burden of proof should be placed on
those who want to seek same-sex marriage, when you yourself have just said, at
least finally said, that it hasn't been all that sweet and dandy with the way
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things have been. Why merely preserve a status quo and on that ground alone
shift the burden of proof to those who want to change it? There are plenty of
people who live as married. I myself have a partner for five and a half years.
That person is very special to me. To this day, he is my power of attorney, and
I'm his attorney. I live with him as a couple and I would like to have that
marriage recognized. I would like to have him not fear bringing me to a
Christmas party at his place of employment, which he did at the time. I
testified to this when we got the civil rights ordinance, the human rights
ordinance passed in the city of Chicago. I don't see any reason to make the
burden of proof be on those who want to have self-fulfillment, have human
capacity fulfillment. It seems to me when you yourself admit things haven't
been so hunky-dory, that the burden of proof is on those who want to keep
things the way they are. That's the way I think it should go.
DELL: Let me make a quick response. I do have to leave. I want to just
recount an experience I had my first year at Broadway Church when a visiting
adult daughter of one our members came and heard me preach a sermon in
which I endorsed same-gender services of holy union and marriage. As we left
the sanctuary, she said with a very pleasant smile, "Reverend Dell, do you really
think that two people of the same gender can commit their lives to each other,
understand each other and support one another? Do you really think it is
possible for people of the same gender?" I said, "I've been married for almost
thirty-one years. I'm not convinced it is possible for people of the opposite
gender." [laughter]
I think there are real dangers in doing the kind of analysis out of
sociological data. For instance, approximately three times as many gay
teenagers commit suicide as straight teenagers. Does that mean that being gay
in itself suggests some weakness in psychological make up? Or do we need to
look more broadly and ask the question, what happens to a young person as
they discover that they are gay and lesbian? So I just want us to be cautious
about making use of so-called scientific analyses when we are making
evaluations of what is fulfilling for people. And at the same time, taking a
more-I would say-realistic view, on what these so-called normative patterns,
that society has had for at least two thousand years in Western society, have
actually produced.
AUDIENCE: I find it interesting that the differences that Professor Duncan
mentioned were focusing on playing with trucks. I happen to know many
married couples who share a rig and drive together, so I don't see that as being
gender-based or sex-based. But we are ignoring the differences in holding
infants. There is extensive medical literature, in fact, involving questions about
women in prisons being able to nurture their babies. There is extensive medical
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literature that shows that tactile contact with infants is extremely important
and I find it troubling that you have all those saying there's an eight-times
differential in the homosexual mothers holding of children of the opposite sex
than you did of the heterosexual mother. As a feminist, Professor Nussbaum,
how do you reconcile what at least currently medical science would suggest
could have severe detrimental effects?
NUSSBAUM: Well, I haven't read all the studies and I don't know therefore
how much holding they suggest is important but what I do know is that cross-
cultural studies of child-rearing in India have shown that mothers in India
typically don't hold their infants in the same way at all. They tend to carry
their infants on their hip while they're doing other tasks and the infant is
introduced to a larger network of an extended family and of village group
much earlier than the American child. What Stanley Kurtz, who is an expert on
Indian child-rearing practices has argued-and I have no view on this because
these studies are very few and I don't know them all either-Kurtz just thinks
that maybe there is something to be said for that, because we know that the
very intense romantic bond between infant and mother may be the source of
an idealized set of romantic expectations in later life, as Proust so beautifully
demonstrates, and therefore of some unhappiness. Whereas making a child part
of a group may be the source of a more realistic set of social expectations. To
me that is a hypothesis, I don't know, but we need to look at things not only in
the American spectrum. But we need to consider a wide range of child-rearing
practices, all of which seem to produce rational adults, before we could be able
to say anything at all on that question.
AUDIENCE: I don't know that Professor Samar addressed the question
Professor Duncan posed. Because Professor Samar, your argument is based on
autonomy, and not of being permitted to do anything unless it violates the
rights of others. So I'm curious, if two brothers want to marry, or three
brothers want to marry, or if three brothers and a dog want to marry, [laughter]
how does that violate the rights of others? That's just as good as an autonomy
argument.
SAMAR: Let's get rid of the dog, because I'm not sure the dog can consent,
as an issue of autonomy.
AUDIENCE (same): Well I disagree with you on that. But it is interesting
that your opening objection is that the dog cannot consent. [laughter]
SAMAR: Since you raised it on autonomy, and the dog can't consent, that
seems to be enough right away to dispense with it on that. Now in terms of the
remainder we are back again on the slippery slope ground. You seem to want to
say that because we open the door to same-sex marriage, therefore we open the
door to all these things. Perhaps what we need to do is, we need to look at each
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type of case-situation-maybe we have to look at incest, maybe we have to look
at polygamy-and ask on its merits, are there good grounds to allow it or not,
or is autonomy ultimately harmed by that. In the case of polygamy, if women
are not allowed to marry more than one person, but men are, that may have a
further way of detrimenting women in the sense of domination of women. In
the case of incest, there are biological, medical, and health reasons. But there
may be other areas where those problems don't hold up, where there is enough
distance, or it is not going to lead to children, or something of that sort. Those
matters need to be looked at individually on the merits, and I don't think that
our discussion of same-sex marriage, because we allow one thing necessarily
means we will or will not allow the other. So on that ground, I think that
you're in the wrong forum for that issue to be discussed.
WOLF: But it is not just that we're talking about apples and oranges. Your
defense of same-sex marriage, will in principle apply in these other cases, unless
you can distinguish them in principle, and not simply case by case.
SAMAR: The defense of same-sex marriage that I'm making applies to all
areas of autonomy in which you can add to human capacity fulfillment. That
much is true, and if those areas did that, it would apply to that. But then the
question becomes, are the other forms of arrangements indeed going to
contribute to human capacity fulfillment? Part of that is a conceptual question;
what do we mean by human capacity fulfillment? But more often, part of it is
also an empirical question. So there would be specific relevant information to
come in on each of those types of cases that may or may not apply to the other
ones. Since part of the empirical part would be to find out information as to
the subject of same-sex marriage, we would need to have that information
available.
WOLF: So, you would be prepared to await empirical evidence that will
justify same-sex marriage, as you are with the others?
SAMAR: In the case of same-sex marriage, as in the case of the any of the
other matters that would come up as well, the burden of proof, I have said, is
on those who would want to restrict it. If there is empirical evidence, if there is
other kinds of evidence out there, that burden of proof then needs to be met by
the people in question.
AUDIENCE: I would like to challenge Professor Duncan's notion that
legalizing same-sex marriage would represent a radical change, particularly
from the standpoint of the subjects that you are talking about. Same-sex
couples have always existed and will continue to exist. They have raised
children throughout history and will continue to do so. All that recognition
would change is the context, the legal context, in which they can do that. I
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guess I don't see how that's radical, from the standpoint of the specific social
topics that you've mentioned.
DUNCAN: Well, my view is that it radically changes the understanding and
definition of marriage, which has classically been understood as the union of a
man and a woman. Ancient Roman law had that definition. That wasn't
foisted on us by Christianity. That is the consensus definition of the world on
that subject. So it represents a radical change. Admittedly, there have always
been homosexual relations, but they have been considered separate and distinct
from marriage, which was always between a man and a woman. It would be as
if we were to say that from henceforth, law firms shall be considered marriages.
My point would be, well, then you've changed what marriage is. Even people
who are married now are doing something different than they were before
because now law firms are sorts of marriages. I guess there's a definitional point
here that I think is quite radical.
NUSSBAUM: Let's go back to Rome, because I think there is an issue here.
Marriage in Rome was several different things. It was a way of cementing
control over women. And we know that even in Augustus' very repressive Lex
Julia DelAvutelieres, it was not adultery for the husband to sleep with a slave or
a hetaera, or any kind of woman who wasn't somebody else's wife or daughter.
It was only a problem if he slept with somebody else's wife or daughter.
Whereas for the woman to sleep with anyone else, it was the crime of adultery.
So it was a highly asymmetrical institution. I don't suppose you defend those
legal asymmetries today. And when we've changed those asymmetries, we've
changed what marriage is. On the other hand, in Rome, too, it was also
increasingly conceived of as a form of emotional companionship. Susan
Treggiari's very fine book on Roman marriage shows that, by contrast to
Greece, Roman marriage was a way of expressing love and commitment over a
complete life.43 The inscriptions of graves of spouses express this kind of love
and loyalty. Now it's that element that presumably your questioner is saying is
one that has always been there for same-sex couples. So what would be done is
to play up that element and not the other element. So it is not like calling a law
firm a marriage.
DUNCAN: Well, one of the other aspects of the classical Roman
understanding of marriage was ordered to the procreation and education of
children. That's in Justinian's Institutes, it's in the Digest, right in the opening
passages: "the union of the male and female for purposes of procreation and the
education of children."
43. Susan Treggiari, Roman Marriage: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time of Ulpian
(Oxford 1991).
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NUSSBAUM: Yes, but they loved adoption, and there was a tremendous
amount of adoption in Rome-often, because there was a high rate of
childlessness, who knows why. Marcus Aurelius was an adopted child. So,
many of the Roman families that we know about got their children by
adoption. They didn't have a moral problem with that.
DUNCAN: Right, but nor do I with adoption.
NUSSBAUM: But then the question is why not? If you think that marriage
is inherently ordered towards the procreation of children, then you ought to
have a problem with adoption, as I suppose Jewish law under some
interpretations has had that problem.
WOLF: [nods]
AUDIENCE: I have a question about autonomy again-I'm sorry I don't
mean to beat a dead horse. Many advocates of same-sex marriage have used the
autonomy-based argument, but many supporters of the gay rights' movement
when it comes to anti-discrimination laws, don't seem to be as concerned with
individual autonomy when it comes to refusal to deal or the right to exclude.
Professor Epstein has often said that he thinks the autonomy principle should
include those rights when it comes to anti-discrimination laws. I wonder what
you think of those and whether or not that has any implication for your
autonomy-based argument on same-sex marriage.
SAMAR. Well if you remember what I said about autonomy, I said that it
had to be maximal autonomy. And that meant to maximize the rights of
everyone equally, and not that it's maximizing autonomy in the libertarian
sense of the term where we are just concerned about overall maximizing
autonomy and without concern for distribution. I am concerned about
distribution so it's maximal autonomy generally. So in that sense the autonomy
does include an equality principle built into it.
AUDIENCE: I don't seem to understand that. Everyone should have the
right to exclude, is what the argument is. And many supporters of gay rights
anti-discrimination laws reject that. That being the case, how can you rely on
individual autonomy in the marriage context.
SAMAR. To exclude whom?
AUDIENCE: Anyone you want, is the principle. Freedom of contract. Anti-
discrimination laws impinge on that autonomy right.
SAMAR: In this situation, where you are talking about freedom of contract,
people do not have to enter contracts with any other person...
AUDIENCE: Does that include the boy scouts in New Jersey?
SAMAR: Let me finish. People do not have to enter into contracts with any
other person, if the contracts are strictly for their individual personal benefits.
But if the contracts have broader implications, social implications, or create a
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part of an arrangement that the state sanctions, then that arrangement has to
be available to everyone. Not having it available to everyone, only available to a
select group, would be to give a kind of support by the state to the
arrangements of individuals, even if those are discriminatory. That would be
the state being colluded into being a part of the discrimination itself. That's
what I would object to.
AUDIENCE: How far would that extend? Would that extend to a landlord
who just has a single apartment and doesn't want to rent out to homosexuals?
SAMAR: Well, as a general rule, the ways the laws have been written, we
have usually allowed landlords up to units of five to exclude someone from
their apartments. But anything larger than that-and that's just because there's
a feeling that there's a kind of close relationship that doesn't exist in a larger
more independent kind of arrangement of a larger number units. For that
reason, for example, we recognize more of a kind of familial or close
relationship. But if you are asking me in general should the landlord do that, I
don't think a landlord should use criteria of sexual orientation as a way of
exclusion. I think that still would be wrong. But I can see in that case the
amount of harms would be minimal, so there's a kind of de minimis argument,
and given that, it adds to the self-fulfillment of the individual landlord, one
could say that it is in a murky area
WOLF: But the chocolates between five or six? [laughter]
SAMAR: Only one or two.
NUSSBAUM: In the back.
AUDIENCE: This is for Rabbi Wolf. I have a question about religious
leadership. In this type of legislation, it seems that religious leadership is
crucial. I know that the Unitarian Universalist Church openly supports same-
sex marriage as well as supports legislation legalizing same-sex marriages. I'm
wondering how you feel about major religions as a whole as a group supporting
this type of legislation, getting involved.
WOLF: I think the Unitarians have a big problem of no boundaries. This is
a case where they didn't even think much about it because they don't have to.
Their style is to go for all such, I will say, trendy [laughter], but all such simply
ethical matters. I think what we learned about ethics in this generation, is that
ethics must be grounded, that ethics must come from somewhere. It must
depend on something,; it must be related to a place and to a time and to a
tradition. Now I think that's radical. I don't think that is at all conservative. I
agree with Professor Nussbaum that the whole question of marriage has to be
seriously reconsidered. The problem of heterosexuality is at least as complicated
as the problem of homosexuality and it is hardly discussed at all. So I do
Same-Sex Marriage 29
believe that from these religious and other traditions, grounded and
boundaried, can come a serious critique of contemporary American law.
AUDIENCE: I consider that placing the burden of proof on those who want
change is like considering the defendant guilty until proven innocent. And
based on this reasoning, how are you going to get any proof of cases that are
not tainted by the attitudes of society towards children being raised in the face
of such antipathy from the sociological sources. I don't know how in the world
you're going to get any atmosphere where you can raise a child for years to
come until society is more accepting of these changes.
DUNCAN: Well as a practical matter, given the context, I would be
perfectly satisfied if such a question were to be resolved democratically after
debate and discussion-as opposed to being decided basically by a handful of
elites in the judiciary and then foisted on the rest of society, which is basically
the strategy that is being pursued, very vigorously, by advocates of same-sex
marriage. They want this change to occur by judicial fiat essentially. The
current polls indicate that the American public is opposed to this by a wide
majority. I think until those who are interested in this project can convince the
general public, I think it is a bad idea.
NUSSBAUM: Let me just comment on that. I think it is very important to
remember that we've had some of the same issues around interracial marriage,
adoption, and child custody. There's a case-the law students all know, I'm
sure-Palmore v Sidoti," where there was a couple who divorced, then the
woman remarried to an African-American man, and wanted to get custody of
the child of the former marriage. And the argument was used by the lower
court that the child would be very unhappy because the child would encounter
all of the prejudice that attaches to an interracial family. And the Supreme
Court overruled on the grounds that you must not turn private prejudice into a
source of public law. We're in danger of doing that in this discussion. I agree
with you that it is very hard. I think it is quite extraordinary that these children
do as well as they do on all the major uncontroversial indicators of well-being,
considering what they face in the society around them.
Hannah, do you want to comment upon that?
GARBER-PAUL: I think you're absolutely right. I find it fascinating that
these children are able to survive as well as they do, given the immense pressure
by society to conform. My comrades, my cohorts, who are gay and lesbian face
enormous pressure to be quiet about that. The suicide rate, which I believe
Reverend Dell brought up, gay and lesbian youth are more than three times as
likely to commit suicide. And approximately two-thirds of gay and lesbian
44. 466 US 429 (1984).
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youth have been clinically depressed at one point or another. Our society is not
supportive of people who don't fit the traditional definition of sexuality when
they actually deal one on one with those people. And I'm amazed that these
children are doing so well right now.
Getting back to that information, those studies. I found it very interesting
that they didn't comment on the role of fathers, only on the role of the
mothers holding the children. I would be curious to know if the
disproportionate amount of the mothers holding the children could have been
impacted by the fact that there were two mothers holding the children all of
the time rather than a single mother who got all of the nurturing role and the
father didn't play much.
DUNCAN: As to that latter point, I honestly don't know. As to the former
point as to why they don't talk about the fathers, it is because-it is not by
accident-almost all the studies of homosexual parenting deal with the lesbian
mothers. I think the reasons for that has to do with the features peculiar to the
homosexual male population. Promiscuity is a big factor in that population.
NUSSBAUM: It is difficult for them to get custody of the children.
[laughter] Let me ask you, who was it who was referred to as the mother, then?
Does that happen to be the one of the lesbian couple that is the biological
mother? Is that the one they are assuming that she's the one who is holding;
that she's the one we should be looking at?
DUNCAN: You've got me. I'd have to...
NUSSBAUM: I think that's pretty important because most of the holding
studies show that it could be any person. Of course, adoptive mothers hold
their children, too.
DUNCAN: I didn't bring up this study. I didn't support this study. It was
the study that the proponents brought up. I didn't bring it up.
SAMAR: One also has to be careful about the majoritarian argument that
would simply leave everything up to current majority rule. We have several
reasons to think about that going back to the Federalist papers where there has
always been a concern about the tyranny of the majority and that there might
be some limitations. That's why they adopted a whole Bill of Rights. In
addition to that, we also have to recognize as Ackerman has pointed out at
Yale, that the amount of thinking that people do about legislation is relatively
small. It is like whether I should go to the grocery store at night. Versus what
they think about in terms of important constitutional changes, this may
involve a lot more attentive thought over a longer period of time. If we simply
leave thinking to a simple majority in a short period of time, which is not a
great amount of thought, important rights could be lost. When you balance
that with the fact that autonomy is in part why we justify democracy and the
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majority control that it yields and it supports, then we must make sure that in
the process of supporting that majority control, we don't underwrite
autonomy. We don't take away from that. And that's been an argument that
has gone back in terms of argument in the literature of jurisprudence at least
ten years.
AUDIENCE: Professor Duncan, could you cite your study on which you
base your claim about promiscuity and homosexual males? Was that your own
study?
DUNCAN: Let's see. I probably can if you give me a second.
AUDIENCE: Is there a higher quality study than those offered for the
Romans and Greeks?
DUNCAN: How about Andrew Sullivan?
AUDIENCE: He's not a sociologist.
DUNCAN: How about the book called, The Male Couple: How Relationships
Develop, by McWhirter and Andrew Mattison, 1984.' This is a comprehensive
study of 156 male couples and was cited by the proponents of same-sex
marriages. It observed that, "Of 156 male couples studied, only 7 couples had a
totally exclusive sexual relationship..."
AUDIENCE: It is an unreliable sociological study.
AUDIENCE: It is not a random sample.
DUNCAN: Well you asked me for the cite. And I'm giving it to you.
AUDIENCE: Poor faith, professor.
DUNCAN: Well, I've got the cite here.
NUSSBALUM: Let me just mention the Lauman study, which I think is the
only statistically pure and reliable study on numbers of sexual partners. Because
their funding was cut, they couldn't study enough homosexual couples to have
reliable data about that. I think that the conclusion should be we just don't
know.
DUNCAN: Well we don't know, but this is what the advocates said. "Only
seven couples of one hundred fifty-six had a totally exclusive sexual
relationship, and these men have all been together for less than five years.
Stated another way, all couples with a relationship lasting more than five years,
have incorporated some provision for outside sexual activity in their
relationship. That's of every single couple studied..
WOLF: Sounds like my congregation. [laughter]
45. David P. McWhirter and Andrew M. Mattison, The Male Couple: How Relationships Develop
(Prentice-Hall 1984).
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AUDIENCE: I merely wanted to ask whether the word "data" was relevant
to heterosexual relationships when we address these kinds of issues. But I
couldn't put it any better than Arnold did. [laughter]
WOLF: Careful, or you'll be a statistic.
AUDIENCE: Yes, but you won't know which one. [laughter] But I do want
to point out, first of all, the things that Hannah had said with regard to the
inadequacies of the statements regarding for example which mother held which
child. And I think until you look at those kinds of details, those kinds of
studies don't have a lot of weight.
The other thing to point out, though, and it's a corollary to Arnold's
comment, is that all of the children we do have lots of data on with regard to
early teenage pregnancy, conduct disorder, trouble with the law, bad school
performance, and I could go down the list-in fact, we do know that those
preponderances do come from heterosexual families. And so I think that
argument is moot.
AUDIENCE: Professors Duncan, Nussbaum, and Samar, does the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
require the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, and if so, under what theory
of interpretation?
DUNCAN: Well, I would say no. There are a number of federal court cases
making that point. So again, the burden of proof is on the other side.
NUSSBAUM: I think of course the question would be really under what
theory, and we'll hear from Andy Koppelman the relevant considerations. I
think the big question would be whether to try to think of homosexuals as a
suspect classification for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, which of
course is a strategy that has been tried again and again, lots of different places.
It has usually failed to get beyond the state courts. Or whether to try to do
what Andy Koppelman has very eloquently argued, and that is to think about
the denial of this right as a form of sex discrimination. And I think that is a
more strategically powerful theory at the present time. It also seems to me to
have a lot of depth, because it is true that our fear, loathing, and confused
sentiments about same-sex unions are bound up with the history of compulsory
heterosexuality and the idea that the binary relationship between a male and
female has to have a certain traditional form. So I think that going in that
direction will be the most promising direction.
SAMAR: I too will let Koppelman and Strasser comment on this in the
second hour, but I would point out that one has to be careful about taking the
positivist position here. And that is to simply say that we have some sort of
written legal documents, and that those documents are the starting point for all
of light and truth and shine. The fact is those documents only have moral
